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INTRODUCTION 
ince the beginning of the twentieth century,1 the United States has 
waged a “War on Drugs” by attempting to reduce both the supply 
	
* Lecturer in Economics, San Jose State University; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason 
University. My books include THE SOUL OF LIBERTY (1980), PUBLIC GOODS AND 
PRIVATE COMMUNITIES (1994), DICTIONARY OF FREE-MARKET ECONOMICS (1998), and 
THE DEPRESSION OF 2008 (2007). I write a weekly column for The Progress Report, and I 
am an associate editor of Econ Journal Watch and a member of the editorial board of the 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology. My main areas of research include public 
economics, social ethics, real estate economics, and private communities. I thank the 
editors of the Oregon Law Review for their excellent work. 
1 See, e.g., Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). For a complete 
discussion of U.S. controlled substances regulation, see Peter J. Boettke et al., Keep Off 
the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy, 91 OR. L. REV. 1069 
(2013). 
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and the demand of illegal drugs. The attempt to reduce demand is a 
domestic policy, while the attempt to reduce the supply implicates 
both domestic and foreign policy. The foreign dimension includes 
both an attempt to stop the importation of drugs and an attempt to 
reduce the foreign production. As this Article will show, however, the 
United States’s economic justifications for regulating foreign drug 
manufacturing is misguided and has resulted in more pervasive and 
severe crime abroad. 
Part I of this Article proceeds with a general background of the 
United States’s regulation of foreign drug manufacturing and 
importation. Part II examines the effects of the War on Drugs in 
individual countries. In those countries that have distanced 
themselves from the United States’s regulatory model, the attempt to 
limit drug supply has been more successful. If the United States is 
willing to learn from those alternative models, the War on Drugs 
might become more effective both domestically and abroad. Part III 
poses support for more liberal regulation of illegal drugs and explores 
how U.S. regulators might begin facing obstacles to decriminalization 
or legalization. 
I 
THE U.S. WAR ON DRUGS 
In 1988, James M. Van Wert, Executive Director of the U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, articulated 
the federal government’s three justifications for narcotics control: (1) 
reducing the supply reduces the domestic use; (2) “reducing the 
supply of illicit narcotics may reduce the level of organized crime and 
lawlessness in the United States,” although organized crime can be 
exacerbated when the least efficient traffickers are eliminated; and (3) 
reducing the supply helps defend friendly countries affected by 
traffickers.2 However, each of these goals has been disputed if not 
refuted by economic and other studies.3 
The economic effects of drug-reduction policy depend on the 
elasticities of supply and demand: the responsiveness of the quantity 
demanded and the quantity supplied to a change in cost. The costs of 
supplying drugs include the risk of being convicted and punished, the 
	
2 James M. Van Wert, The US State Department’s Narcotics Control Policy in the 
Americas, J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF., Summer–Autumn 1988, at 1, 1. 
3 E.g., GLENN GREENWALD, CATO INST., DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: 
LESSONS FOR CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES (2009), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/greenwald_whitepaper.pdf. 
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loss of confiscated goods, and the cost of conflict among drug cartels. 
But even if these factors cause the supply of illegal drugs to fluctuate, 
demand remains the same. Given that the consumers of illegal drugs 
tend to be addicted, their demands are highly inelastic: the quantity 
demanded responds little to a change in the price. 
Hence, a demand-side policy of educating people to avoid illegal 
drugs, plus propaganda on the bad effects, may be effective in 
reducing the quantity consumed; however, the supply-side policy of 
reducing production and importation is bound to fail, as its initial 
effect is mainly to drive up the cost of provision and the price paid by 
the users. Punishing the production and sale of drugs acts like a tax on 
supply, raising the cost of production.4 
Subsequently, successful evasion may restore the previous supply, 
and successful “marketing” of addictive substances can then increase 
demand, which induces a greater quantity supplied.5 The supply-
reduction efforts may also alter the quality of the drugs, such as to 
increase the potency per volume.6 
Such effects are easily illustrated. Despite the escalation of the War 
on Drugs during the 1980s, including foreign operations, illicit drugs 
were more readily available and cheaper in 1989 than at the beginning 
of the Reagan presidency in 1981.7 Domestically, the well-publicized 
confiscations and destruction of marijuana and other illegal drugs, and 
the imprisonment of dealers and users, has had little effect on 
supply—even with harsh policies such as civil asset forfeiture. With 
asset forfeiture, property—mainly real estate and automobiles—
associated with suspected crime is confiscated without any 
compensation.8 Civil forfeiture does not require that the property 
owner be convicted of a crime because legally, the property itself has 
violated the law.9 Civil asset forfeiture derives from the concept of 
	
4 Id. at 176. 
5 See David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under 
Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 698–70 (2003). 
6 Id. at 698. 
7 Bruce Michael Bagley, US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a 
Policy Failure, J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF., Summer–Autumn 1988, at 189, 
190, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/165986?seq=1. 
8 TERRANCE G. REED, AMERICAN FORFEITURE LAW: PROPERTY OWNERS MEET THE 
PROSECUTOR 1 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 179, 1992), available at http://www.cato 
.org/doc-download/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa179.pdf. 
9 Id. at 1–2. 
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“deodand” in old English law.10 But even these strong prosecutorial 
tools seem to have had little deterrent effect on illegal drug suppliers. 
Domestically, the War on Drugs has greatly expanded the reach 
and power of federal, state, and local police powers, and along with it, 
increased theft and prison populations. 
By the end of the 1980s, a third of all robberies and burglaries in the 
United States would be committed for money to buy drugs. The 
drug crime wave would have a devastating ripple effect. By 1994, 
drug offenders would make up 30 percent of new inmates pouring 
into the nation’s bursting jails, up from 7 percent in 1980.11 
Hidden importation of illegal substances has also been used as the 
official justification for intrusive policies such as dogs sniffing the 
suitcases of Americans returning from abroad.12 
However, the effect of the U.S. war on the drug trade has had the 
opposite effect on foreign countries, where the War has been 
destabilizing to governments. The elements of such society 
destruction include: (1) the creation of violent cartels, (2) 
exacerbation of already-existing rebellions, (3) drug-lord imperialism, 
and (4) and the creation of underground states. 
First, the War on Drugs has contributed to the creation of violent 
cartels abroad. Since the substances that are illegal in the United 
States are also illegal in the Latin American countries where the drugs 
are produced, the prohibition induces organized crime, just as alcohol 
prohibition in the United States induced organized crime.13 The 
illegality prevents normal competition by advertising, so the 
alternative is the use of force. Since the drug dealers are already 
criminals, the added threat of prosecution for theft and murder 
provides little extra deterrent. Additionally, the cartelization is 
territorial, which induces wars among the cartels for the control of 
space. Moreover, since the cartels do not pay rent or property taxes, 
their costs involve the costs of the violence, rather the normal 
	
10 See id. at 2; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (8th ed. 2004). 
11 CELERINO CASTILLO III & DAVE HARMON, POWDERBURNS: COCAINE, CONTRAS 
AND THE DRUG WAR 21 (1994), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/111246977 
/Powderburns-COCAINE-CONTRAS-AND-THE-DRUG-WAR. 
12 All About Drug Detection Dogs, DOG FENCE DIY, http://www.dogfencediy.com 
/library/drug-detection-dogs/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013); James Stuart, Drug Dogs at 
Airports, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/info_8395751_drug-dogs-airports.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
13 See MARK THORNTON, ALCOHOL PROHIBITON WAS A FAILURE 5–8 (Cato Inst. 
Policy Analysis No. 157, 1991), available at http://www.cato.org/doc-download/sites 
/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa157.pdf. 
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carrying cost of rentals and mortgages. One could call the gains from 
controlling territory a “drug rent.” 
Second, the U.S. War on Drugs has exacerbated already-existing 
rebellions. Insurrections have occurred in Latin American countries 
such as Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala.14 Illegal drugs are a source 
of funds, and since the rebels are already outside the law, the drug 
prohibition provides no deterrence. As stated by Pablo Dreyfus, 
“waging counterinsurgency operations and drug law enforcement are 
two very different matters that have to be treated separately. . . . 
[I]nvolving the armed forces in drug law enforcement only worsens 
the problem by facilitating the spread of corruption in the armed 
forces.”15 
Third, U.S. regulation of foreign manufacturing has caused drug-
lord imperialism. For the territorial entities, expanding the controlled 
territory provides more room to hide, greater areas for production, and 
more secure transit. 
Fourth, the War on Drugs is responsible for the creation of 
underground states. Since territory is conquered and defended by 
force, the drug tyrants seek more powerful weapons, and then their 
power rivals that of the recognized government.16 Territorially 
organized crime becomes an alternative state, collecting revenues via 
protection rackets and kidnaping in addition to the sale of drugs.17 
The territorial drug-based regimes become different from recognized 
governments in degree rather than in kind, since the governments 
recognized as legitimate also use force to impose costs and control 
territory. 
Moreover, organized crime thrives on prohibition. Many people do 
not believe in the justice of the prohibition, and they feel a desire to 
do what is forbidden: drink alcohol, smoke marijuana, gamble, swim 
nude, or hire a prostitute. These strong demands provide a profit 
	
14 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY, EXPLORING REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON LATIN 
AMERICAN INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY THEORY 10 (1991). 
15 Pablo G. Dreyfus, When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and 
Shining Path in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995, 15 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. 
JUST. 370, 370 (1999).  
16 See Drug Cartels Have Incredible Power in Mexico and USA, EUR. UNION TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.eutimes.net/2011/11/drug-cartels-have-incredible-power-in    
-mexico-and-usa/ (describing the Los Zetas cartel, which is comprised of military-trained 
members). 
17 See Colombia: A Disease with Staying Power, STRATEGY ROOM, 
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/colombi/20130317.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
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opportunity for organized crime in providing alcohol, illegal drugs, 
gambling venues, and prostitution. 
While the U.S. role in the drug war in foreign countries has helped 
to intensify these conflicts and exacerbate the consequences, the 
United States did not initiate many of the drug wars of other 
countries. The governments of Mexico and other countries initiated 
their own wars on drugs.18 However, the United States plays a leading 
role both in being an importer of drugs and in providing assistance to 
the governments of foreign countries. 
II 
FOREIGN EFFECTS 
Each year, the U.S. President designates particular countries as 
being major drug transit or major illicit drug producers, pursuant to 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.19 President Obama 
identified the following countries in 2011: Afghanistan, The 
Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela.20 The list did not include the United States itself. 
The memorandum stated that “[a] country’s presence on the Majors 
List is not necessarily an adverse reflection of its government’s 
counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United 
States.”21 The report then identifies the countries that do have such 
adverse status: “I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as 
countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 
months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under 
international counternarcotics agreements.”22 This was the fourth 
consecutive year in which the U.S. government had pointed to Bolivia 
	
18 See Drug Cartels Have Incredible Power in Mexico and USA, supra note 16. 
19 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 § 706(1), 22 U.S.C. § 2291j-
1(1) (2006). 
20 Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Transit of Major Illicit Drug 
Producing Counties for Fiscal Year 2012, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 640 (Sept. 15, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/15/presidential    
-memorandum-major-illicit-drug-transit. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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and Venezuela, both hostile to the United States, as drug-war 
failures.23 
A. Country Studies 
1. Colombia 
Colombia, torn by civil wars for decades, has incurred a substantial 
cost to both its society and its land because of rebels financed by 
illegal drugs. Colombia’s largest leftist rebel movement, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly known as 
FARC, receives revenues from the drug trade.24 “Some 500,000 
families grow coca, opium poppies and marijuana because they have 
few other choices in raising their incomes.”25 
By providing aid to fight the rebels, the United States became 
involved in the conflict by initiating “Plan Colombia,” a project that 
had cost $5 billion as of 2008.26 In 2000, there were several hundred 
U.S. military advisers in Colombia, including U.S. Special Forces, 
former Green Berets, Gulf War veterans, and personae from the CIA-
backed operations in Central America.27 Despite the war against the 
rebels and drug producers, coca production in Colombia expanded in 
the 1990s. In the decade after 2000, Colombia was the world’s largest 
coca producer.28 Much of the cocaine consumed in the United States 
has come from Colombia.29 
An extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia 
enables Colombia to extradite any Colombian suspected of drug 
	
23 Phillip Smith, Bolivia and Venezuela Scoff at Obama’s Drug War Criticism, Tell US 
to Look in the Mirror, ALTERNET (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/drugs/bolivia  
-and-venezuela-scoff-obamas-drug-war-criticism-tell-us-look-mirror. 
24 The Guerilla Groups in Colombia, UNRIC BRUSSELS, http://www.unric.org/en 
/colombia/27013-the-guerrilla-groups-in-colombia (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
25 Fred E. Foldvary, Colombia Ruined by Drug Wars, PROGRESS REP., http://www 
.progress.org/fold155.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
26 The Associated Press, Colombia Aid Failed to Halve Drug Making, Report Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/world/americas/06 
colombia.html?_r=0. 
27 The US Plan for Colombia, SOCIALISM TODAY (Oct. 2000), http://www.socialism 
today.org/51/colombia.html; see also Quagmire in Colombia, THIRD WORLD TRAVELER, 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/South_America/Quagmire_Colombia.html (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2013) (from the July 2001 edition of the Progressive magazine). 
28 Elizabeth Briggs, Cocaine’s Forgotten Victims, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. 
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.coha.org/cocaines-forgotten-victims. 
29 Frontline, The Colombian Cartels, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline 
/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
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trafficking to the United States and to be put on trial there for their 
crimes.30 The Colombian internal war and U.S. involvement in the 
Colombian drug wars intensified after the Caguán peace negotiations 
came to an end in 2002.31 But “[t]he elimination of the Medellín and 
Cali cartels merely decentralized the Colombian drug trade. Instead of 
two large organizations controlling the trade, today some 300 smaller, 
loosely organized groups do so.”32 
Just as the United States used defoliation as a tactic in the Vietnam 
War, the United States used spraying to reduce the coca plantations.33 
However, this defoliation also destroys the rain forest.34 The spraying 
also kills food crops such as yuca, plantains, and corn.35 The 
fumigations force farmers to leave the coca-growing areas.36 But the 
chemical fumigation attacks have not stopped the coca growing.37 
Colombia remains one of the world’s largest producers of cocaine, 
although since the peak of 2000, cocaine production has been reduced 
by 60 percent.38 
Also, just as the destruction of marijuana farms in the United States 
drives some growers into national forests,39 so too in Colombia, coca 
growers invaded the jungles to grow the crop there.40 The United 
	
30 Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, U.S.-Colom., Sept. 14, 1979, S. 
TREAT. DOC. NO. 97-8 (1981), available at http://internationalextraditionblog.files 
.wordpress.com/2011/03/colombia1.pdf. 
31 Refworld, Human Rights Watch World Report 2003—Colombia, UNHCR (Jan. 14, 
2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3e2818780.html (presenting a report by 
Human Rights Watch). 
32 TED GALEN CARPENTER, TROUBLED NEIGHBOR: MEXICO’S DRUG VIOLENCE POSES 
A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 8 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 631, 2009), available 
at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa631.pdf. 
33 Thomas D. Williams, US Role in Massive Aerial Herbicide Spraying Revealed, PUB. 
REC. (July 19, 2009), http://pubrecord.org/world/2547/aerial-herbicide-spraying                 
-colombia/. 
34 Colombia: Where U.S. Policy Kills, WITNESS FOR PEACE, http://witnessforpeace.org 
/downloads/Col_Fumigations_factsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 UNODC Reports Divergent Coca Cultivation Trends in the Andean Countries, 
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (June 22, 2010), http://www.unodc.org 
/southerncone/en/frontpage/2010/06/22-unodc-mostra-tendencias-divergentes-do-cultivo   
-de-coca-nos-paises-andinos.html. 
39 See Jennifer Welsh, Pot Growers Destroying National Forests, LIVE SCIENCE (Dec. 
12, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://www.livescience.com/17417-marijuana-growers-national         
-forests.html. 
40 Juan Forero, Deep in the Colombian Jungle, Coca Still Thrives, NPR (Apr. 3, 2007, 
5:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9298685. 
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States then responds with more chemical spraying.41 “The Clinton 
administration . . . pressured the Colombian government to allow a     
. . . more toxic chemical (tebuthiuron, known as SPIKE 20) to be 
dumped across the land, which would permit the planes to fly at . . . 
higher altitudes,” despite the warning by environmentalists “that 
SPIKE 20 could poison ground water and permanently ruin the land 
for agriculture.”42 
FARC chiefs have stated that the drug trade would only be stopped 
if the country resolves its social problems.43 The peace negotiations 
held in Havana, Cuba, in 2012, between FARC and the government of 
Colombia, included, necessarily, the drug issue.44 
In 2000, Acción Andina and the Transnational Institute in 
Colombia offered “A Proposal for Peace,” an alternative drug policy 
proposal for the country.45 The plan includes greater economic 
development and a public health approach to drug consumption, but a 
continued law-enforcement approach to drug trafficking.46 The 
proposal’s development prescriptions include the replacement of crop 
eradication with manual eradication in cooperation with local 
communities.47 It advocates the decriminalization of the small 
producers of drug crops.48 
Continued law enforcement may not be the effective solution. The 
Colombian National Police have captured and deported drug lords, 
but drug traffickers have resisted those actions through political 
assassinations.49 
	
41 Id. 
42 James Bovard, U.S. Stuck in Colombia, BALT. SUN (June 1, 2000), http://articles 
.baltimoresun.com/2000-06-01/news/0006010162_1_colombia-coca-production-toxic        
-chemical. 
43 See Colombia: A Disease with Staying Power, supra note 17; see also Arm the Spirit, 
“We Are In a War”: The FARC-EP and the Laws of War, SOODERSO ONLINE (Sept. 4, 
2000), http://www.sooderso.net/zeitung/magazin02/17krieg-en.shtml. 
44 Drugs on the Agenda of Colombian Peace Talks, TRANSNAT’L INST. (Dec. 10, 
2012), http://www.tni.org/article/colombia-drugs-and-peace. 
45 Alternative ‘Drugs and Peace’ Policy for Colombia, Proposed by TNI and Acción 
Andina, TRANSNAT’L INST. (June 26, 2002), http://www.tni.org/archives/drugs-docs 
_pr260600. 
46 Martin Jelsma & Ricardo Vargas, Drug Crops and Peace Process in Colombia: A 
Proposal for Peace, TRANSNAT’L INST. (June 1, 2000), http://www.tni.org/archives 
/archives_vargas_prop-summary. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Illegal Drug Trade in Colombia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal 
_drug_trade_in_Colombia (last visited Mar. 20, 2013); see also Presidential Candidate 
Assassinated in Colombia, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 26, 1990, 12:00 AM), http://www 
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With better economic opportunities, the farmers in Colombia could 
grow wholesome food crops rather than drugs. Colombia has much to 
offer: gems, flowers, fruits, oil, coffee and many other products.50 
That farmers resort to growing drug plants is an effect of economic 
illness. But rather than confronting the cause, the economic injustice 
and lack of opportunity, the government attacks the symptoms. What 
is needed most is a just distribution of the benefits of Colombia’s 
natural resources and the elimination of legal barriers to production. 
The central issue of the civil wars in Colombia has been land 
tenure. The inequality of wealth in Colombia, as in much of Latin 
America, began with large land grants to the Spanish conquerors and 
settlers, which included the use of Native Indian labor.51 Greater 
equality in land tenure could be accomplished with the least social 
disruption with public revenue from the land rent. The simultaneous 
reduction of taxes on wages, profits, and goods would make 
Colombia more prosperous, and all of its people would then benefit 
more equally from its natural resources. 
The drug trade has inflicted the reverse of land reform; it has 
induced a greater concentration in land tenure. The reduction of 
access to productive land has reduced per-capita income in rural 
Colombia.52 
But greater social justice in Colombia is not sufficient to cure the 
drug problem. So long as drugs are illegal in the United States and in 
Colombia, there will be high profits from drug production. Only an 
end to the War on Drugs in the United States and in Colombia will 
eliminate the artificial incentives to grow the crops in Colombia. 
2. Peru 
In a study of the war on drugs in Peru, Cynthia McClintock 
concludes that “the results of Peru’s war against drugs have been 
similar to results elsewhere: governments have won some battles, but 
they are losing the war.”53 The joint anti-drug programs of the United 
	
.deseretnews.com/article/99059/PRESIDENTIAL-CANDIDATE-ASSASSINATED-IN    
-COLOMBIA.html?pg=all. 
50 Colombia Exports, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/colombia 
/exports (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
51 Dale Adams, Colombia’s Land Tenure System: Antecedents and Problems, 42 LAND 
ECON. 43, 43–44 (1966). 
52 See Drugs on the Agenda of Colombian Peace Talks, supra note 44. 
53 Cynthia McClintock, The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case, J. INTERAMERICAN 
STUD. & WORLD AFF., Summer–Autumn 1988, at 127, 127. 
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States and Peruvian governments induced an alliance between the 
coca growers and Sendero Luminoso, the Shining Path guerilla 
rebels.54 Peruvians supply coca to Colombians who manufacture it 
into cocaine.55 Peru’s farmers sell their coca to gangs controlled by 
Colombian traffickers. 
The Shining Path started its rebellion against the Peruvian 
government in 1980.56 The movement drew its ideology from 
Maoism, creating a tightly-disciplined military organization.57 “By 
the late-1980s, it had . . . more than 10,000 full-time soldiers and 
controlled more than 40 percent of the countryside.”58 The capture in 
1992 of Abimael Guzmán, head of the Shining Path, reduced the 
power of the movement, although there has been a continuing threat 
of resurgence.59 
The U.S.-Peruvian drugs tactics change as they fail and are 
replaced by other methods. During the mid-1980s, the emphasis was 
on manual eradication.60 Coca growers obtained $300 for each 
hectare of coca destroyed, whereas a coca grower could obtain from 
$4000 to $20,000 per hectare of coca.61 Eradications stalled when the 
Peruvians implementing the program were killed in the coca-
producing Huallaga Valley.62 
The manual eradication program was followed by “Operation 
Condor,” using air raids to destroy cocaine laboratories and traffickers 
employing both Peruvian police forces and U.S. pilots and DEA 
officials.63 Its initial successes were temporary. The traffickers 
changed locations, and cocaine refining increased.64 
A third strategy was initiated in 1988: spraying with the herbicide 
Tebuthiuron.65 However, the manufacturer, Eli Lilly and Company, 
	
54 Id.; BTI 2012: Peru Country Report, TRANSFORMATIONSINDEX BTI 2012, 
http://www.bti-project.de/countryreports/lac/per/2012/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
55 Jeffrey Hays, Cocaine, Coca Cultivation, Trade and Anti-Drug Efforts, FACTS & 
DETAILS, http://factsanddetails.com/world.php?itemid=1214 (last updated Mar. 2011). 
56 Jeremy M. Weinstein, A New Threat of Terror in the Western Hemisphere, SAIS 
REVIEW, Winter–Spring 2003, at 1, 3. 
57 Id. at 3–4. 
58 Id. at 4. 
59 Id. at 5, 7–8. 
60 McClintock, supra note 53, at 133. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 130–31. 
63 Id. at 131; see also Peter Andreas, Operation Condor 6: The U.S. Drug War in Peru, 
NATION, Aug. 13, 1988, at 127, 129. 
64 McClintock, supra note 53, at 132. 
65 Id. at 133. 
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stated that it would not sell the herbicide to the State Department due 
to possible reprisals by the drug lords, plus possible liability for 
damaging people and the environment.66 When Dow Chemical began 
spraying in Colombia with its herbicides, the firm demanded 
indemnification against lawsuits.67 Thus, despite their creative and 
adaptive efforts, U.S. and Peruvian regulators have been unable to 
combat the strong economic incentives for illegal drug production in 
Peru. 
3. Bolivia 
Of the several countries discussed here, Bolivia is perhaps the only 
country in which governmental regulation of drug manufacturing—
albeit through very different methods—has been effective. The 
election of Evo Morales, an Aymara native American Indian,68 as 
President of Bolivia was a great moment for the Indians of the 
Americas. Morales was “a farmer who gr[ew] coca, the plant from 
which cocain is produced.” 
[I]n its leafy raw [form,] coca is legal in some parts of Bolivia and 
has been chewed for centuries as a stimulant to help get workers 
through the day. Morales had been an advocate for the cocaleros, 
the coca farmers, seeking to expand coca growing while preventing 
its use for cocain.69 
As in Colombia, the United States brought its war on the supply of 
drugs to Bolivia. “In 2004, the United States spent $150 million on 
coca-eradication programs in Bolivia.”70 
While the U.S. government still blames Bolivia as a source of 
drugs, the Morales government applies “social control” instead of 
destroying crops.71 The state limits coca cultivation in cooperation 
with coca farmer unions by limiting registered coca farmers to a small 
plot of coca.72 The Bolivian government has also promoted coca 
products such as colas, in contrast to cocaine.73 
	
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Fred E. Foldvary, Bolivia’s Indian Chief, FREE LIBERAL (Dec. 28, 2005), 
http://freeliberal.com/archives/001753.php. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Sara Shahriari, Bolivia Breaks the Mold in ‘War on Drugs,’ DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 
10, 2012), http://www.dw.de/bolivia-breaks-the-mold-in-war-on-drugs/a-16329550-0. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.; see also Alexander Frye, Spotlight on Bolivia: The “Coca Diplomacy” of Evo 
Morales, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS. (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.coha.org 
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Such options are possible in Bolivia due to the Bolivian 
government’s recent exit from the U.S. and United Nations regulatory 
programs. The government expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) from the country in 2008.74 In 2011, Bolivia 
“withdrew from [the] United Nations convention that [designates] the 
coca leaf in its natural state [as] a narcotic substance.”75 
Bolivia’s actions have helped to induce a major shift in Latin 
American drug policy. Some officials of other Latin American 
countries are considering joining Bolivia in moving away from U.S. 
policies. Presidents Otto Pérez Molina of Guatemala and Juan Manuel 
Santos of Colombia pushed the Organization of American States 
during its April 2012 summit in Cartagena, Colombia, to engage in a 
study for a more effective drug strategy.76 “For the first time, the U.S. 
was unable to prevent an overt display of dispute over U.S. drug 
policies within the OAS and was forced to accept opening up the 
debate to look at potential alternative policy options.”77 
4. Mexico 
While the United States had been active in aiding the Mexican 
government in its war on drug producers and distributors, the 
Mexican war escalated in 2006 and again in 2008.78 The U.S. 
government pressured Mexican President Felipe Calderón to “wage a 
more vigorous anti-drug campaign.”79 Calderon responded by 
authorizing the Mexican army to lead the country’s war on drug 
dealers, rather than the corrupt police forces.80 
In 2008, the United States promoted Calderon’s policy with the 
Merida Initiative, a partnership with Mexico and Central American 
	
/spotlight-on-bolivia-the-coca-diplomacy-of-evo-morales/ (describing Morales’s “Yes to 
Coca, No to Cocaine” policy). 
74 Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, Why Bolivia Quit the U.S. War on Drugs, TIME (Nov. 4, 
2008), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1856153,00.html; Shahriari, supra 
note 71. 
75 Shahriari, supra note 71. 
76 AMIRA ARMENTA ET AL., A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE MAKING?: SHIFTS IN THE 
LATIN AMERICAN DRUG POLICY DEBATE 1–2 (Transnational Inst., Series on Legislative 
Reform of Drug Policies No. 21, 2012). 
77 Id. at 5. 
78 E. Eduardo Castillo, 22,700 Killed in Mexico Drug War Since 2006, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36485196/ns/world_news-americas/# 
.Uuqtpr-i8n9; Mexico’s Calderon Targets Drug Traffickers, CNN (Oct. 1, 2008, 2:28 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/30/mexico.drugs/index.html. 
79 CARPENTER, supra note 32, at 1. 
80 Id. 
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and Caribbean countries.81 The project is modeled on Plan Colombia 
and has spent $1.6 billion.82 The State Department calls it an 
“unprecedented partnership between the United States and Mexico.”83 
However, the country’s military confrontation with drug cartels has 
resulted in a quasi civil war in which 50,000 persons have died.84 
Drug-relations violence grew, became more vicious, and enhanced the 
corruption of government officials.85 Drug murders tripled in Mexico 
after 2006.86 About 13,000 persons were killed during the first nine 
months of 2011.87 
Furthermore, the conflict between law enforcement and Mexican 
drug lords has had a collateral effect outside of Mexico as well. For 
example, there is evidence that cartel hitmen have attacked people 
inside the United States. People were killed in Laredo, Texas, and a 
child was kidnapped in Las Vegas.88 Border patrolmen have been 
attacked on the U.S. side of the U.S.-Mexico border.89 
The United States has also been involved as a source of guns for 
the drug cartels. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) operated some “gun walking” stings operations 
between 2006 and 2011 under Project Gunrunner and Operation Fast 
and Furious.90 In a tactic called “gun walking” or “letting guns walk,” 
	
81 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid 
.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB861.pdf; Merida Initiative, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/j 
/inl/merida/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Alan Taylor, Mexico’s Drug War: 50,000 Dead in Six Years, ATLANTIC (May 17, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2012/05/mexicos-drug-war-50-000-dead-in-6   
-years/100299/. 
85 TED GALEN CARPENTER, CATO INST., THE FIRE NEXT DOOR: MEXICO’S DRUG 
VIOLENCE AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA 12 (2012). For a related video, see Cato 
Institute, The Fire Next Door: Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America (Ted 
Galen Carpenter), YOUTUBE (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature 
=player_embedded&v=8qCmBuagOKA. 
86 Ian Vásquez, A Dubious Record in Mexico’s Drug War, CATO INST. (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/dubious-record-mexicos-drug-war. 
87 The Associated Press, Mexican Drug War Toll: 47,500 Killed in 5 Years, CBS NEWS 
(Jan. 11, 2012, 9:38 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57357503/mexican      
-drug-war-toll-47500-killed-in-5-years/. 
88 CARPENTER, supra note 32, at 3. 
89 Id. at 4. 
90 Sharyl Attkisson, A Primer on the “Fast and Furious” Scandal, CBS NEWS (June 
26, 2012, 10:54 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-57461204-10391695/a   
-primer-on-the-fast-and-furious-scandal/; see also Furious Folly: Report Finds Fault in 
ATF ‘Gun Walking’ Debacle, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 24, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
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the ATF allowed firearms dealers to sell guns in order to track the 
weapons to Mexican drug cartel leaders.91 This operation has been 
criticized as counterproductive.92 However, stricter restrictions on 
firearms would have little impact on the supply of guns in Mexico. 
Underground sales exist in Mexico as they do in the United States.93 
Yet the Mexican drug campaign did not arise as an issue during the 
presidential debate of 2012 on foreign policy.94 Perhaps this apparent 
lack of dialogue is due to the War on Drugs being a bipartisan issue 
with little disagreement. The only primary candidate to raise the drug 
issue was the Republican candidate Ron Paul.95 
When the military campaign against the drug cartels has some 
impact, the cartels react by moving elsewhere, such as to the northern 
jungles of Guatemala, destabilizing those areas.96 From a global 
perspective, the military campaigns are futile—they create death and 
destruction with little effect on supply and with the spread of the drug 
cartels to new territory. 
Another proposed solution to the importation of drugs from 
Mexico is to seal or better secure the border, such as with the Secure 
Fence Act of 2006.97 But already existing fences have not stopped 
drug importation nor illegal immigration. The importers can move to 
less guarded locations along the 2000-mile long border.98 A fence 
along the entire border would require thousands of troops to keep 
	
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/editorials/furious-folly-report-finds-fault-in   
-atf-gun-walking-debacle-654684/. 
91 Attkisson, supra note 90. 
92 See, e.g., id. 
93 J.D. Tuccille, Mexico Shows that Tight Gun Control Laws Don’t Guarantee 
Compliance, REASON.COM (Dec. 11, 2012, 1:47 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2012/12/11 
/mexico-as-an-example-that-tighter-gun-co. 
94 Ted Galen Carpenter, Why Is Mexico Drug War Being Ignored?, CNN (Oct. 30, 
2012), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/30/why-is-mexico-drug-war         
-being-ignored/. 
95 Jonathan A. Cooper, Ron Paul Blasts Misguided ‘War On Drugs’ in Washington 
State Campaign Speech, HUFFINGON POST (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:43 AM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/17/ron-paul-war-on-drugs_n_1284214.html. 
96 See Ezra Fieser, The Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Cartels, GLOBALPOST (June 11, 
2011, 8:34 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/110531 
/zetas-guatemala-mexico-gangs. 
97 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006). 
98 Tony Payan, The Drug War and the U.S.-Mexico Border: The State of Affairs, 105 S. 
ATLANTIC Q. 863, 865, 870 (2006). 
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watch. As has happened in Gaza, the smugglers build tunnels and 
enter by air and by sea with ships and submarines.99 
In 2009, Mexico enacted a law against drug dealing 
(“narcomenudeo”) that decriminalized the possession of small 
amounts of drugs for personal use.100 However, so long as the 
production and sale are illegal, the government still creates the 
conditions for organized crime to flourish. Decriminalizing small 
household use does have the effect of concentrating law enforcement 
on the large users and dealers, but that then intensifies the 
militarization of the drug cartels. 
An effective campaign against the drug lords has begun to be 
fought by the residents of some Mexican villages. Armed masked 
“vigilantes” guard roads and check travellers.101 They capture 
suspected drug dealers and put them on trial with the villagers as the 
jury.102 The village residents in the state of Guerrero prohibit 
Mexican police and troops from entering.103 Kidnappings have 
ceased, and the action has reduced other crime.104 The success, so far, 
of this home-grown security turns the conventional public-goods 
theory on its head. Whereas the conventional thought has been that 
security is a public good that needs to be provided by government due 
to free riders, the mutual aid of the villagers shows that where lack of 
security is a governmental failure, a cohesive community can provide 
its own security. 
5. Guatemala 
As Mexican drug cartels invade Guatemala’s flat northern jungles, 
the President of Guatemala has shifted to a new policy—one that is 
drastically different and, thus far, more successful than U.S. drug 
	
99 John Hudson, The Economics of Mexican Drug Tunnels, ATLANTIC WIRE (Aug 3, 
2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/08/economics-mexican-drug-tunnels 
/55387/. 
100 JORGE HERNÁNDEZ TINAJERO & CARLOS ZAMUDIO ANGLES, MEXICO: THE LAW 
AGAINST SMALL-SCALE DRUG DEALING (Transnational Inst., Series on Legislative 
Reform of Drug Policies No. 3, 2009), available at http://www.tni.org/sites 
/www.tni.org/files/download/dlr3.pdf; see also The Associated Press, Mexico Legalizes 
Drug Possession, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21 
/world/americas/21mexico.html?_r=0. 
101 Nicholas Casey, Mexico’s Masked Vigilantes Defy Drug Gangs—And the Law, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2013, 10:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278 
87323829504578272032483616560.html. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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regulation. A former military general, President Otto Perez Molina 
proposed a state-run legal market in drugs in March 2012.105 
President Molina stated, 
We cannot eradicate global drug markets, but we can certainly 
regulate them as we have done with alcohol and tobacco markets. 
Drug abuse, alcoholism and tobacco should be treated as public 
health problems, not criminal justice issues. Our children and 
grandchildren demand from us a more effective drug policy, not a 
more ideological response.106 
While drugs remain illegal in Guatemala, President Molina’s 
proclamation is an encouraging example of new thinking that could 
redress caused by present drug policies. 
6. Portugal 
In 2001, Portugal decriminalized the personal purchase, 
possession, and consumption of all drugs, including cocaine and 
heroin.107 However, “trafficking,” possession of more than ten day’s 
normal consumption, is still a crime.108 The predictions of opponents 
of liberalization—that decriminalization would result in much higher 
rates of drug use or make Portugal an international drug haven—have 
not come true. However, the predicted benefits have come true: 
Portugal has seen a large drop in drug-related deaths as access to 
medical treatments for drug-related illness increases.109 Other 
members of the European Union have also been moving towards 
depenalization, although still committed to keeping these drugs 
illegal.110 
Unfortunately, “the United States has displayed very little interest 
in understanding the improving trends in Europe generally, and in 
Portugal specifically, that have clearly resulted in an environment of 
drug liberalization and decriminalization.”111 On the other hand, the 
	
105 Sara Miller Llana, How Latin America is Reinventing the War on Drugs, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (July 30, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/0730 
/How-Latin-America-is-reinventing-the-war-on-drugs. 
106 Otto Pérez Molina, We Have to Find New Solutions to Latin America’s Drugs 
Nightmare, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis 
free/2012/apr/07/latin-america-drugs-nightmare. 
107 Maia Szalavitz, Drugs in Portugal: Did Decriminalization Work?, TIME (Apr. 26, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1893946,00.html. 
108 GREENWALD, supra note 3, at 3. 
109 Id. at 17, 19. 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 Id. at 27. 
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U.S. government evidently did not seek to prevent Portugal from its 
decriminalization, perhaps because it is not a major drug producer and 
has a relatively small population, and perhaps because President 
Clinton was occupied with more urgent matters when the legislation 
was considered in 1998–99 and passed in 2000.112 With the recent 
passage of legislation decriminalizing marijuana in Washington and 
Colorado,113 however, there is some hope that the debate may 
become more open.114 
7. Afghanistan 
The eradication programs of the United States have failed in 
Afghanistan as well,115 as U.S. policy makers have ignored both 
economic theory and the lessons of history. It is the task of economics 
to reveal the implicit reality beneath superficial appearances. It seems 
as though the brute force method of destroying crops reduces the 
supply. But the reality is that a strong demand will defeat supply-
reducing methods. For example, farmers could mix opium with legal 
crops. Moreover, if the United States spent many billions of dollars to 
totally wipe out the opium crop in Afghanistan, it would cause 
massive suffering and make even more and stronger enemies of the 
U.S. presence.116 Eradication is damaging to farmers’ livelihood, 
especially when it is done close to harvest time, when the farmer has 
already invested his labor and resources. 
The poppy crop eradication in Afghanistan is conducted by the 
U.S.-controlled Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) and the 
Afghan National Police (ANP).117 The effective policy would be to 
replace poppy cultivation with other crops that would provide as 
	
112 Id. at 6–7. 
113 Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Semi-legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington: 
What Comes Next?, OUPBLOG (Dec. 19, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://blog.oup.com/2012/12 
/semi-legal-marijuana-co-wa/. 
114 See The420Guy, President Clinton States Marijuana Should Be Decriminalized, 
420 MAGAZINE (Dec. 14, 2000), http://www.420magazine.com/forums/international          
-cannabis-news/4054-president-clinton-states-marijuana-should-decriminalized.html 
(posting a message from the NORML Foundation). 
115 Azmat Khan, Frontline, Why Eradication Won’t Solve Afghanistan’s Poppy 
Problem, PBS (Jan. 3, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline 
/afghanistan-pakistan/opium-brides/why-eradication-wont-solve-afghanistans-poppy          
-problem/. 
116 See id. 
117 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME & GOV’T OF AFGHANISTAN, 
AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2005, at iii (2005), available at http://www.unodc 
.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/afg_survey_2005.pdf. 
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much income. That would require attention to land tenure, since much 
of the value of crops is economically explicit or implicit land rent 
rather than wages.118 Greater incomes would also require better 
opportunities for women. A shift to other sources of income would 
also require safety and security, in order to attract investment. 
Regarding income from poppies versus other crops, Mohammad 
Ehsan Zia, Afghan Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development, disputed that poppy crops generally provide greater 
income: 
Farmers who grow opium lose other possible sources of income. 
For example, agriculture and animal husbandry go hand in hand in 
Afghanistan. Farmers who grow other crops can also keep animals, 
such as a dairy cow, a donkey for transportation, goats or sheep. But 
if they grow poppy they don’t have fodder from their plants to feed 
the animals. Instead they have to buy it, and if they lack the money 
they have to sell their animals. We must not only focus on what 
people get from their land but also on other possible sources of 
income.119 
While the reduction of poverty requires economic development, it 
can be sabotaged by an eradication program. “[E]xperience from the 
field shows that the simultaneous use of alternative development and 
eradication—often referred to as the ‘carrot and stick approach’—is 
counterproductive.”120 A thematic evaluation on alternative 
development by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
found that “[a]lternative development projects led by security and 
other non-development concerns were typically not sustainable—and 
might result in the spread or return of illicit crops or in the 
materialization of other adverse conditions, including less 
security.”121 
	
118 David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Chapters 2–3, 
LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP1a.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2013). 
119 Tillmann Elliesen, Afghanistan Must Sit in the Driver’s Seat, QANTARA.DE (Aug. 3, 
2006), http://en.qantara.de/Afghanistan-Must-Sit-in-the-Drivers-Seat/6331c6400i1p459/ 
(interview with Mohammad Ehsan Zia, Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development of Afghanistan). 
120 MARTIN JELSMA ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL INST., LOSING GROUND: DRUG 
CONTROL AND WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 10 (Drugs & Conflict Debate Papers No. 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/200702281633543041 
.pdf. 
121 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A 
GLOBAL THEMATIC EVALUATION—FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT, at vii (2005), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative_Development_Evaluation_Dec-05.pdf. 
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The Taliban reportedly stimulates opium cultivation in the south by 
providing protection for those who grow poppies while harming those 
who do not.122 If farmers grow poppy, the government destroys the 
crop. If they do not, the Taliban kills them. The refusal to grow poppy 
implies that the farmer is allied with the government. It is clear, then, 
that the United States’s model, precipated on theories of democracy, 
has not and does not translate well to Afghanistan and other unstable 
countries. 
III 
DECRIMINALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION 
The prohibition of substances has many dimensions: moral, 
religious, legal, economic, political, psychological, sociological, 
criminological, and historical. The moral dimension begins with the 
ethical issue of whether the ingestion of particular substances is 
inherently evil, or else whether it is the prohibition that is evil. 
Optimal policy requires a rational, non-arbitrary justification, which 
in turn implies a logical, non-arbitrary, comprehensive, and universal 
ethic. 
“Harm” needs to be distinguished from mere “offenses.” Under 
Lockean theory of natural moral law, as expressed by the universal 
ethic, “harm” would consist of an invasion, an unwelcome entering 
into another’s domain.123 In contrast, an offense is an act that the 
recipient deems to be disagreeable only because of his beliefs and 
values.124 Just as speech is not really free if one may not make 
statements just because others dislike it, actions are not ethically free 
if any person may veto it from a personal whim. Hence, for the 
universal ethic, offenses are morally neutral, and only coercive harm 
is morally evil.125 
For the ingestion of drugs, the basic rules of the universal ethic 
have a clear implication. The ingestion of food, drinks, and drugs 
does not inherently harm others, and is, by natural moral law, a 
neutral act. Since the function of natural moral law is to prescribe 
	
122 See Okke Orstein, Taliban Threatens ‘Grow Poppy or Die!,’ NEWSMAX.COM (Nov. 
17, 2006), http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/11/16/162941.shtml?s=lh 
(stating that the Taliban distributes “Grow poppy or die” leaflets to farmers). 
123 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 123–24 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 
Hafner Press, The Hafner Library of Classics No. 2, 1947) (1690). 
124 See id. 
125 FRED E. FOLDVARY, THE SOUL OF LIBERTY: THE UNIVERSAL ETHIC OF FREEDOM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 41–47 (1980). 
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proper governance and proper legal law,126 the universal ethic 
prescribes that there be no prohibition of any act which is good or 
neutral. Therefore, a society whose law is based on natural moral law 
does not prohibit the ingestion of any substance. Indeed, a free 
society, whose laws coincide with natural moral law, has no 
prohibition or restriction on the production, exchange, and 
consumption of any drug, so long as others are not coercively harmed. 
Under moral law, too, the prohibition of peaceful and honest acts, 
those which are good or neutral, violates liberty and natural rights, by 
imposing the will of some persons on unwilling victims.127 Natural 
moral law implies equal self-ownership. By natural law, an adult may 
do physical damage to his own health. The prohibition of drugs is 
therefore a moral evil. 
The demand for illegal drugs derives from personal desire as well 
as from addiction. Many drug users evidently believe that ingesting 
the substances is not morally wrong, and they are not stopped by legal 
prohibitions. The fact that former illegal drug users have been elected 
President128 and achieved other important offices shows that light to 
moderate use does not necessarily create long-term disabilities, and 
that much of the population does not heed the law,129 just as many 
drivers exceed a speed limit when they think it is set below the safety 
limit. As to bodily damage, policy is inconsistent in having alcohol 
and tobacco legal, while prohibiting marijuana and other substances. 
To the extent that drugs are addictive, as noted above, the demand 
is inelastic: the quantity has a small response to a higher price. The 
economic effect of drug prohibition is mainly to drive up the price, 
which then induces greater theft. 
Even prisons, with their comprehensive security, do not keep drugs 
out, even with a zero-tolerance policy.130 The prohibition of drugs in 
prisons has some justification, since to be a prisoner is to not have the 
normal rights to liberty and choice, and drugs can increase violence. 
	
126 LOCKE, supra note 123, at 123–24. 
127 See FOLDVARY, supra note 125, at 37–41, 49–51, 273. 
128 See, e.g., The420Guy, supra note 114. 
129 JEFFREY DHYWOOD, WORLD WAR D: THE CASE AGAINST PROHIBITIONISM—A 
ROADMAP TO CONTROLLED RE-LEGALIZATION 318–19 (2011). 
130 Drug Legalization Debate Divides the Americas, HUFFINGTON POST CANADA (Apr. 
13, 2012, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/04/13/war-on-drugs-canada-us     
-mexico-summit-of-the-americas_n_1423020.html. 
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Yet drugs get smuggled into prison in food and clothing brought by 
family members and inside human bodies.131 
The prohibition of any substance drives the enterprise underground 
so long as there is a demand. The legalization of only possession still 
leaves production and distribution underground and subject to 
territorial conflicts and bribery. 
Legalization removes the territorial imperative from the drug trade. 
For example, since food is legal, food stores have no turf to defend. 
Stores may coexist next to each other. Legal enterprises compete via 
price and advertising as well as by location, but the territory of a firm 
does not extend beyond the boundaries of the land title. It is perhaps 
for this reason that most economists favor decriminalization, or, to a 
lesser extent, legalization.132 
The legalization of medical marijuana by several U.S. states, and 
now the legalization of any marijuana use in Colorado and 
Washington in the 2012 election,133 could reduce the demand for the 
importation of marijuana, if the federal government does not interfere. 
The federal government has shut down medical marijuana distribution 
in California and other states,134 so if it also seeks to stop the 
legalization process, the beneficiaries will be the drug cartels. 
In order to move in the right direction, proponents will need to 
combat the stubborn forces that have suported the United States’s 
War on Drugs. The tobacco and alcohol industries provide funding to 
political campaigns, including campaigns to oppose the legalization 
of marijuana.135 Along with police unions dependent on drug-war 
grants, private prisons that profit from cannabis incarceration, 
pharmaceutical companies that would lose business to medical 
marijuana, and prison guard unions, the alcohol makers contributed to 
anti-legalization efforts.136 The tobacco lobby also spends millions of 
dollars on candidates and campaigns. 
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The root cause of many governmental iatrogenic ills—social 
problems caused by government—may well be in the structure of 
mass democracy, whereby there is an inherent demand for campaign 
funds by special interests.137 Thus a decentralization of democracy 
that reduces the influence of moneyed interests may well be required 
in order to remove the political obstacles to the reform of the drug 
laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence from the countries described in this Article is 
consistent with the conclusions from economic theory: that the 
supply-reduction policies promoted by the United States and other 
countries have failed because they have perverse effects on 
incentives. Because the demand for drugs is not reduced, 
prohibitionist policies create high-profit opportunities for drug 
criminals; their rent seeking in turn induces violent conflicts for 
territory. 
The forward-thinking model of Portugal and the proposals of 
leaders such as the President of Guatemala provide solutions that 
remove the causes of the policy-induced drug wars by replacing 
chaotic violence with orderly markets. The experience of Portugal 
provides evidence that drug decriminalization does not result in 
massive demand; society will not fall apart when drug use is no 
longer a crime. The decriminalization of drugs in the United States 
would eliminate a costly exercise in futility as well as eliminate the 
demand for drugs from the cartels and reduce harms on foreign lands. 
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